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Public debt, GDP growth, and austerity: why Reinhart and
Rogoff are wrong
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 austerity has been the cornerstone of economic
policies in the U.S. and Europe. In 2010, these policies were given a significant boost by the
publication of research by Harvard University Professors Reinhart and Rogoff, which stated that
cutting public spending to control deficits, would help to restart economic growth. Robert Pollin
discusses new research which shows that several of Reinhart and Rogoff’s critical findings were
incorrect. He argues that after compensating for the mistakes made, the data shows that that the
relationship between growth and public debt varies widely over time and between countries, and
that countries that are approaching a 90 percent ratio of public debt to GDP may not necessarily
be at a danger point for economic growth.
In 2010, the Harvard University economics professors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published a paper in
the American Economic Review, “Growth in a Time of Debt,”  that spoke to the world’s biggest policy question:
should we cut public spending to control the deficit or use the state to rekindle economic growth? This paper
subsequently served as an important intellectual bulwark in support of austerity policies in the United States and
Europe. It has been frequently cited by major economic policymakers, including the US Congressman Paul Ryan,
the UK Chancellor George Osborne, and Olli Rehn, the leading economic official of the European Commission.
Indeed, the Economics Nobel Laureate and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman observed that “Reinhart-
Rogoff may have had more immediate influence on public debate than any previous paper in the history of
economics.”
However, my co-authors Thomas Herndon and Michael Ash and I showed, initially in an April 2013 preliminary
working paper of the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) titled “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle
Economic Growth,” that several of the critical findings advanced in the Reinhart-Rogoff paper were wrong. Our
working paper set off an intense global debate through much of the spring of 2013, including multiple responses
by Reinhart and Rogoff themselves, and rejoinders by my co-authors and I.
Now, in a final, fully refereed version of our paper , with
the same title and published online in December 2013
with the Cambridge Journal of Economics, we examine
these questions further, by expanding the range of our
critique of the Reinhart-Rogoff research, and addressing
the responses advanced by Reinhart and Rogoff in
response to our initial working paper. Reinhart and Rogoff
have referred to this debate as an “academic
kerfuffle,” yet we think the debate has been constructive
because it has brought greater clarity over the ideas
shaping austerity policies in both the United States and
Europe. We would welcome a formal substantive
response by Reinhart and Rogoff to
our published CJE paper.
The Reinhart-Rogoff research is best known for its result
that, across a broad range of countries and historical
periods, economic growth declines dramatically when a
country’s level of public debt exceeds 90% of gross
domestic product. Working with the Reinhart-Rogoff data
set, we show that there is no evidence to support this claim.First, in their work with a sample of 20 advanced
economies over 1946-2009, they report that average (i.e. the mean figure in formal statistical terms) annual GDP
growth ranges between about 3% and 4% when the ratio of public debt to GDP is below 90%. But they claimed
that average growth collapses to -0.1% when the ratio rises above a 90% threshold.
However, Herndon, Ash, and I show that these results were based on three sets of mistakes: (1) exclusion of
some of the available data; (2) coding errors with their working Excel spreadsheet; and (3) inappropriate methods
for averaging statistics to produce their overall results. For example, because of these data-handling problems, a
one-year experience in New Zealand in 1951, during which economic growth was -7.6% and the public debt level
was high, ends up exerting a major influence on their overall findings. Indeed, this 1951 experience in New
Zealand exerted equal influence on their overall findings as 19 years in which the UK economy operated with high
public debt/GDP ratios. The UK economy experienced postwar growth at an average rate of 2.4% over these 19
years.
When we performed accurate recalculations using Reinhart-Rogoff’s dataset, we found that, when countries’ debt-
to-GDP ratio exceeds 90%, average growth is 2.2%, not -0.1%. We also found that the relationship between
growth and public debt varies widely over time and between countries. For example, for the years 2000 to 2009,
the average GDP growth rate for countries carrying public debt levels greater than 90% of GDP was either
comparable to or higher than those for countries whose public debt/GDP ratios ranged between 30 and 90% .
In their response to our April 2013 working paper, Reinhart and Rogoff say that their incorrect GDP growth figures
based on average (i.e. mean) GDP growth rate calculations, were never what they had emphasized in any case,
either in the 2010 paper itself or subsequently. They argued that they had always given more credence to the
alternative measures of GDP growth reported in their 2010 paper, which are the median figures (medians being
another way to measure central tendencies in data). Most importantly, they observed that, using either our
corrected average figures or the medians from their 2010 paper, GDP growth declines by about one percentage
point when the public debt/GDP ratio crosses the 90% threshold.
Yet there were serious problems with Reinhart and Rogoff’s response. The most obvious was that the median
GDP growth figures they reported in their 2010 paper are distorted by the same errors that affected their average
growth figures. Indeed, in an “Errata” memorandum responding to our working paper, when Reinhart-Rogoff
themselves corrected their Excel coding error and included all the data for all countries in their spreadsheet, the
differences in median economic growth rates falls by only 0.4 percentage points between countries whose public
debt/GDP ratio was between 60-90% and those where the ratio was over 90%—from 2.9 to 2.5% median GDP
growth. In other words, based on Reinhart-Rogoff’s own recalculations in their Errata memo, we actually see, with
their preferred median figures, still stronger evidence that there is no significant drop off in growth when a country
passes the 90% public debt/GDP threshold. Reinhart-Rogoff themselves do not highlight this result in their Errata
memo.
Reinhart and Rogoff also initially defended their 2010 findings by referring to the results with their dataset
spanning 220 years, from 1790-2009. However, as we show in our CJE paper, they made the same statistical
errors generating these 220-year calculations, and their results are similarly distorted. For example, with the 1790-
2009 data, a one-year experience in Norway in the 60-90% public debt/GDP category—when economic growth
happened to be an exceptionally high 10.2%—is accorded equal weight with 23 years in Canada, 35 years for
Austria, 42 years for Italy, and 47 for Spain. We show that when properly recalculated, there is no difference at all
in the average GDP growth rates over 1790-2009 for the countries in Reinhart-Rogoff’s dataset in which public
debt ranges between 90-120% relative to countries in which public debt/GDP fell between 60-90%.
What does our critique of the Reinhart-Rogoff research mean in terms of economic policy? Consider a situation in
which a country is approaching the threshold of a 90% public debt/GDP ratio. It is simply not accurate to assume
that these countries are reaching a danger point where economic growth is likely to decline precipitously.
Rather, our corrected evidence shows that a country’s growth may be somewhat slower once it moves past the
90% public debt-to-GDP level. But we cannot count on this being true under all, or even most, circumstances. Are
we considering the US demobilization after World War II or New Zealand experiencing a severe one-year
recession? Our evidence shows that one needs to ask these and similar questions, including whether slow growth
was the cause or consequence of higher public debt, before we can draw meaningful conclusions.
More generally, as my co-authors and I write in concluding our CJE paper, “policymakers cannot defend austerity
measures on the grounds that public debt levels greater than 90% of GDP will consistently produce sharp declines
in economic growth.”
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